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AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES v. FEDERAL
LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
CUSHIONING THE IMPACT OF THE
FEDERAL SERVICE IMPASSES PANEL
ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
FEDERAL SECTOR
Private sector employees enjoyed collective bargaining rights'
for more than twenty-five years prior to their public sector coun-
terparts in the federal sphere.2 Federal employees were originally
' See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1982)). The political climate fostered by the
Great Depression and the New Deal legislation was favorable to federal legislation which
was conceived to be essential to the growth of organized labor. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LA-
BOR LAW 25 (C. Morris ed. 1983) [hereinafter LABOR LAW]. The Depression and its concomi-
tant mass insecurity steered the workers toward labor unions. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN,
FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 20 (1950). Pursuant to section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA"), commonly known as the Wagner Act, employees
were empowered to form labor organizations, to bargain collectively through these organiza-
tions, and to engage in concerted activities to enforce their rights. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1 (1976). The judiciary has ruled
that the right to engage in concerted activities encompasses the right to strike. See Com-
ment, Public Employee Legislation: An Emerging Paradox, Impact, and Opportunity, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 931, 932 (1976). The Wagner Act reflected a congressional attempt to
spawn industrial peace in interstate commerce through the formation of labor unions as an
effective voice for the individual worker. R. GORMAN, supra, at 1. See also C. GREGORY, LA-
BOR AND THE LAW 230 (1946) (Wagner Act was congressional attempt to remedy harm to
national economy caused by strife over organizational activities of unions). The National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), as chief mechanism for the administration and enforce-
ment of the Wagner Act, id. at 233, must implement congressional intent in situations which
were not foreseen in detail when the legislation was enacted and in anticipated situations
which could not have been provided for with adequate specificity. Id.
The Wagner Act passed constitutional muster in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Supreme Court found that acts which directly burden or ob-
struct interstate commerce are within the reach of congressional power. Id. at 31. The Court
asserted that Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce was plenary and could be
exercised to protect interstate commerce from any danger which threatens it. Id. at 37. The
Court held that the determination of whether a specific act affects commerce in such a close
and intimate fashion as to be within the realm of congressional power, and therefore within
the authority granted to the NLRB, was to be resolved on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 32.
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) ("employer" does not include United States, any state,
or political subdivision). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 1 (NLRA is primary body of
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accorded collective bargaining rights via an executive order issued
by President Kennedy.3 Federal labor-management relations were
federal law controlling labor-management relations in private industry).
Prior to the 1960's, ideology, the nature of governmental employment, and the legal
environment inhibited public employee unionism. See R. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 9 (1984). Restrictions on public employees' collective bargaining rights par-
tially derived from the conception that the relationship of the public employer to the public
employee differs from the private employer-private employee relationship in that the former
is sovereign while the latter is not. See Developments in the Law - Public Employment, 97
HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1616 (1984) [hereinafter Public Employment]. The sovereign employer
traditionally retained the power to impose the terms and conditions of employment upon its
public employees. See M. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
83 (1976); see also Note, The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971:
Another Public Employment Experiment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 134, 141 (1972) (negotiation by
public employer, regarded as entity which could not relinquish its right to act unilaterally,
deemed illegal delegation of authority). The sovereignty doctrine, which had experienced
various measures of success in suppressing government unions, assumed the aura of ideol-
ogy. R. KEARNEY, supra, at 9.
The nature of governmental employment, a second factor which inhibited public em-
ployee unionism and collective bargaining, featured strong job security, good pensions, and
merit system protections against many forms of management abuse in the federal sector. Id.
at 10; see also W. GERSHENFELD, J. LOEWENBERG, & B. INGSTER, SCOPE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR
BARGAINING 3 (1977) (public employees did not press for organization and collective bargain-
ing because content with job security). Finally, prior to the extensive changes which took
place at all levels of government during the 1960's, the legal environment was strongly op-
posed to public sector unionism. R. KEARNEY, supra, at 10.
3 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1963). The primary objective of the executive
order was to provide federal employees with a greater opportunity to engage in the adminis-
tration of their jobs, thereby contributing to the effective conduct of public business. M.
NESBITT, supra note 2, at 134. The restricted scope of bargaining and the ban on bargaining
over wages, benefits, and union security provisions led to dissatisfaction with the executive
order among the union ranks. See R. KEARNEY, supra note 2, at 44. Kennedy's executive
order provided that arbitration could only be advisory and that agency head approval was
required for enforcement of an arbitration determination. See Smith & Wood, Title VII of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: A "Perfect" Order?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 859 (1980).
The executive order circumvented the subject of impasse resolution and failed to provide a
viable alternative to the strike, which was still prohibited in the federal sector. See Com-
ment, Federal Sector Strike Injunctions: Who May Request Them and Where?, 31 AM. U.L.
REV. 681, 687-88 (1982).
President Nixon's Executive Order No. 11,491 supplanted Kennedy's Executive Order
10,988 in 1970. See Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
7101 app., at 793-98 (1982). Executive Order 11,491 created the Federal Labor Relations
Council ("FLRC"), a disinterested third party which was to be responsible for the adminis-
tration and construction of the new order. R. KEARNEY, supra note 2, at 45; Comment,
supra, at 688.
The Nixon order created the Federal Service Impasses Panel (Panel), which was em-
powered to consider negotiation impasses upon either party's request, and to "take any ac-
tion it considers necessary to settle an impasse." Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 5, 3 C.F.R. § 861
(1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app., at 794 (1982). Moreover, the Panel could authorize
arbitration or third party fact-finding to resolve impasses. See id. at § 7101 app., at 797. The
Panel's purpose was to make collective bargaining more meaningful and to maintain govern-
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subsequently given a statutory basis through the promulgation of
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act,4 the administration of
which was entrusted to the Federal Labor Relations Authority
("Authority").5 The statute authorized the Federal Service Im-
passes Panel ("Panel") to continue to take any necessary action to
resolve negotiation impasses, including the imposition of "binding"
terms in contracts.6 Section 7114(c) of Title VII provides that any
ment sovereignty in the strike issue. See Cunningham, Labor-Management Relations in the
Federal Sector: Democracy or Paternalism?, 31 LAB. L.J. 636, 641 (1980). The Panel, an
independent unit within the Federal Labor Relations Council, fulfilled the need for a central
third party agency to settle disputes. See M. NESBrT, supra note 2, at 288.
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982). Courts had declined to review actions arising under the
executive orders on the ground that there was no statutory basis supporting federal question
subject matter jurisdiction. See Smith & Wood, supra note 3, at 874. Federal employees
sought a statutory basis for labor-management relations, since they recognized that any fu-
ture President or Congress could modify or rescind the executive order. R. KEARNEY, supra
note 2, at 46. This led to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Id. Title
VII of the Act established a statutory basis for federal sector labor-management relations,
enacting into law for the first time the rights and obligations of the employees, agencies and
labor organizations. See H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1978). See also Com-
ment, Federal Sector Arbitration Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 17 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1980) (Title VII immunized federal sector labor-management rela-
tions from presidential modifications). The Act was a codification of the rights previously
accorded to federal employees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate through la-
bor organizations in decisions which affect their working conditions. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)
(1982); S. REP. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1977).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982). The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("Authority") was
intended to be the NLRB's public sector counterpart in the federal sphere. See Coleman,
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Its Meanings and Its Roots, 31 LAB. L.J. 200, 202
(1980); H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1977). See also New Jersey Air Nat'l
Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1982) (Authority estab-
lished to play role analogous to that of NLRB in private sector), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982).
The Authority is composed of three full time executives who cannot engage in any other
business or employment or hold any other position with the United States Government. See
5 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (1982). By replacing the highly politicized FLRC with the independent,
bipartisan and neutral Authority, Congress intended to promote effective labor-management
relations in the federal sector. See 124 CONG. REc. 27,534, 27,550 (1977). Impartiality was to
be guaranteed in labor-management cases by requiring that the members of the Authority
be chosen independently rather than by virtue of their services as federal managers. S. REP.
No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2723,
2730.
6 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(C) (1982). The Panel is composed of at least seven members
appointed by the President based on their fitness to perform the duties and functions in-
volved, their familiarity with government operations, and their knowledge of labor-manage-
ment relations. See id. at § 7119(c)(2) (1982).
An impasse is a deadlock in negotiations caused by the failure of collective bargaining
to produce an agreement, thereby confronting the parties with the decision of whether to
continue bargaining. See Decker, Pennsylvania's Public Employee Relations Act (Act 195)
and Impasse-The Public Employer's Right to Make Unilateral Changes in Employment
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agreement between the parties to the negotiations, namely the fed-
eral agency and the federal employees' representatives, is contin-
gent upon approval by the agency head.7 Recently, in American
Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that the Authority reasonably construed Title VII by rul-
ing that agency head disapproval of a term imposed by the Panel
was sanctioned under section 7114(c), and that arbitration was an
improper forum for the review of such disapproval. 9
In American Federation of Government Employees, the
American Federation of Government Employees ("Union") sought
a Statement of General Policy from the Authority addressing the
issue of whether the agency heads can disapprove agreements im-
posed on the parties by the Panel.10 The Authority determined
Conditions, 86 Dicr L. REV. 1, 2 (1981). If a negotiation impasse cannot be resolved by
voluntary arrangements such as mediation, either party may request the Panel to consider
the matter. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1) (1982). Alternatively, the parties may agree to submit
the negotiation impasse to binding arbitration if the Panel approves of the procedure. Id. at
§ 7119(b)(2).
If either party requests the Panel to consider the impasse, the Panel must either recom-
mend procedures for its resolution or "assist the parties in resolving the impasse through
whatever methods and procedures ... it may consider appropriate to accomplish the pur-
pose of this section." Id. at § 7119(c)(5)(A)(ii). If the parties are still unable to reach a
settlement, the Panel may conduct hearings on the matter and "take whatever action
is necessary and not inconsistent with this chapter to resolve the impasse." Id. at §
7119(c)(5)(B)(iii). This power has been construed by the Panel to include the imposition of
terms in contracts. See Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 CHI.[-]KENT
L. REV. 815, 835-36 (1984). See also Nebraska Military Dep't v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 705 F.2d 945, 950 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983) (Panel may force adoption of disputed propos-
als). Such final and binding action renders this step of dispute resolution the equivalent of
interest arbitration. See FEDERAL SERVICE IMPASSES PANEL, A GUIDE TO DISPUTE RESOLU-
TIONS USED BY THE FEDERAL SERVICE IMPASSE PANEL 4 (1980). Therefore, the Panel functions
as a mechanism of last resort in the expeditious resolution of disputes after negotiations
reach an impasse. See Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
7 See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(c) (1982). Section 7114(c) provides that an agency head must
approve any agreement consistent with the chapter and all other applicable laws, rules or
regulations within 30 days. Id. at § 7114(c)(2) (1982). The agreement automatically becomes
binding on the parties at the end of the 30-day period if the agency head does not disap-
prove in that period. Id. at § 7114(c)(3) (1982). The agency head's disapproval of a provision
in a locally negotiated agreement pursuant to section 7114(c) review is tantamount to an
allegation of non-negotiability for purposes of appeal to the Authority. See National Fed'n
of Fed. Employees, 7 F.L.R.A. 608, 608 (1982).
8 778 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
9 See id. at 862-63.
10 Id. at 854-55. Interpretation and Guidance, 15 F.L.R.A. 564 (1984), the publication
in which the Authority printed its determination, was the focus of the court's review, since
the facts which prompted the request for guidance were considered irrelevant to the court's
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that agency heads are authorized under section 7114(c) of the Civil
Service Reform Act ("Act") to review the legality of all provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement, including Panel-imposed
terms.11 Further, the Authority found that the Union could only
seek review of an agency head's disapproval of such provisions
through the expedited review of negotiability issues under section
7117(c) of the Act, or through claims of unfair labor practices
against the agency.12
The District of Columbia Circuit Court explained the relevant
provisions of the Act" and applied a deferential standard of review
in affirming the Authority's decision.1 4 Writing for the majority,
Judge Wald rejected the Union's contention that the "binding"
provision in section 7119(c)(5)(C) automatically precludes head of
agency review of a Panel-imposed term. Judge Wald also deter-
decision. See American Federation, 778 F.2d. at 855 n.9.
" Interpretation and Guidance, 15 F.L.R.A. 564, 567 (1984).
12 See id. at 567-68. The Authority determined that the agency head's disapproval of
the agreement is tantamount to an assertion of non-negotiability and, therefore, not review-
able through the negotiated grievance procedure. See id.
13 See American Fed'n, 778 F.2d at 851-54. The majority asserted that Congress cre-
ated mechanisms to resolve negotiability disputes arising from the sections of the Act which
provide that certain subjects are non-negotiable. See id. at 852. The court found that a
government agency's duty to negotiate in good faith under the Act does not encompass
every matter, and that the Act specifically excludes from negotiation matters inconsistent
with federal law, any governmental or agency rule or regulation and certain management
perogatives. See id. at 852-53. Judge Wald noted that section 7117(c) entitles a union to an
expedited review of negotiability issues by the Authority, which must render a decision at
the earliest practicable date. See id. at 853. The majority determined that negotiability is-
sues may be raised subsequent to the execution of an agreement when the agency head
rejects the agreement within 30 days under section 7114(c)(2) and when a party raises the
illegality of an agreement which has already taken effect in an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. Id. at 853-54.
The court noted that the Panel is not authorized to decide negotiability disputes be-
cause such disputes are within the Authority's domain. See id. at 854. The majority found
that Panel decisions, which are not directly reviewable by the courts, may be indirectly
reviewed in the context of an unfair labor proceeding when the agency fails to comply with a
Panel-imposed term. See id. Either the Authority or the court may determine that a failure
to comply is warranted because the subject is non-negotiable. Id.
11 Id. at 856, 861. The court, in accordance with precedent, noted that a "reasonably
defensible" construction of the Act by the Authority should be sustained. See id. at 856.
The majority reasoned that the court's task was not to determine whether the Authority's
interpretation of the Act was the best, but rather, to determine whether its interpretation
was clearly contrary to the statute or unreasonable. See id. at 861.
15 See id. at 856-57. The majority found that Panel-imposed terms are binding only to
the extent that such terms are within the Panel's statutory authority. See id. at 856. It
noted that the parties could seek resolution of negotiability issues in an unfair labor practice
proceeding and, therefore, the term "binding" could not be dispositive. See id. at 856-57.
Judge Wald determined that since the agency head need not comply with a Panel-imposed
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mined that the word "agreement" as used in section 7114(c)(1),
that provides for head-of-agency review, encompasses all terms of
collective bargaining agreements whether such terms result from
negotiation or imposition by the Panel. 6
The majority suggested that the Act's policy of expeditious re-
view of negotiability issues was promoted by allowing the agency
head to disapprove the agreement within the thirty day period.17
Thus, the Authority's harmonization of sections 7114(c)(1) and
7119(c)(5)(C) was reasonable.' The agency head's disapproval of
the agreement, which is the equivalent of an assertion of nonnego-
tiability, was held not reviewable via a negotiated grievance
procedure. 19
Judge Ginsburg, dissenting, agreed that neither the clear lan-
guage nor the legislative history of the Act resolved the conflict
between sections 7114(c)(1) and 7119(c)(5)(C). 20 However, Judge
Ginsburg asserted that the Authority's interpretation frustrated
the congressional purpose underlying the Act, and therefore was
term which is ultimately found to be non-negotiable, the sole issue is whether the agency
head can trigger expeditious review of the negotiability issue under section 7114(c). See id.
at 857.
"' See id. at 857. The majority cited American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Locals 225,
1504 & 3723 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 712 F.2d 640, 646 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1983) for
the proposition that Panel-imposed terms adopted by the parties become part of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See id.
17 See American Fed'n, 778 F.2d at 859. The court determined that Congress estab-
lished the 30 day period because it was unwilling to place a perpetual burden on the agency
head to review every proposal as it arose in the course of daily bargaining. See id. at 858.
Judge Wald found that participation of the Panel did not safeguard against the imposition
of illegal terms since the Panel does not decide negotiability disputes. See id. at 858-59.
The court felt that prohibiting the agency head's invalidation of a Panel-imposed term
within 30 days compels the agency head to challenge the provision through noncompliance
and a subsequent defense of non-negotiability in the resultant unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. Id. at 859-60. The majority noted that agency head invalidation of a term voids the
entire agreement and is not limited to the allegedly illegal provision. Id. at 860 n.16. Judge
Wald noted that the court's decision merely delays the whole process by giving the agency
head an extra 30 days to assert non-negotiability, which his subordinates could have done
prior to the Panel's decision. See id.
18 Id. at 861. The court felt that neither the plain meaning nor the legislative history of
the Act required that the agency head's authority to approve be subordinated to the Panel's
authority to impose settlement. See id. at 857.
10 Id. at 861-62. The majority determined that the Authority is the proper forum for
review of an agency head's invalidation under the expedited negotiability appeal provision
of section 7117(c). See id. at 862.
20 Id. at 864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg noted that Congress evidently
desired the Panel to be the final arbiter in contract disputes between agencies and unions; it
also intended to maintain the boundaries of management set forth in the Act. Id. (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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not a "reasonably defensible" construction of the Act.21 Noting
that the bargaining capacity of federal employees hinges on the
equitability of the impasse resolution procedure, 22 the dissent cau-
tioned that the Authority's decision, which unduly postpones the
resolution of the validity of the Panel-imposed settlement, creates
the potential for agency abuse of that procedure.23 The dissent
suggested that the agency head review should not extend to Panel-
imposed settlements, and that the unauthorized rejection of a
Panel-imposed term by an agency head is a simple contract viola-
tion, properly challenged through the grievance procedure and
arbitration.24
The American Federation of Government Employees court
sustained the Authority's construction of the Act, which subjected
Panel-imposed terms to agency head review, and determined that
the parties' negotiated grievance procedure was an inappropriate
forum for review of an agency head's invalidation of such terms. It
is submitted that the majority properly upheld the Authority's in-
terpretation of the Act, which was reasonably defensible. It seems
clear that Congress must amend the Act to accomplish satisfacto-
21 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 865 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that Congress intended the
Panel to be a substitute for the right to strike by enabling the unions to compel a recalci-
trant agency to accept a termination of the dispute. Id. at 864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 865-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg determined that the Author-
ity's interpretation created "suspicion and distrust on the part of the union and intransi-
gence, even guile, on the part of the agency." Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
According to Judge Ginsburg, the Authority, beset by its backlog of cases, may not issue
a decision for three years, thereby rendering the Panel-imposed term worthless to the union
when it is finally upheld in some cases. Id. at 866 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that some losses generated by the time lapse are incapable of compensation through
retroactive relief. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg concluded that the Author-
ity's decision vitiated the bargaining capacity of federal employees without serving any over-
riding consideration relating to efficiency and effectiveness of government. Id. at 867 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 868 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent determined that Congress antici-
pated that the Panel members would be far more sophisticated and knowledgeable than the
agency head in determining the compatibility of contract provisions with the applicable
laws. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized Panel members to national
officers, whose negotiated contracts were statutorily excepted from agency head approval.
See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Judge Ginsburg noted that the Panel, in accordance with its own procedures,
must decline jurisdiction of any negotiability issues and allow resolution of such issues by
the Authority. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the composition
and procedures of the Panel, as well as the administrative process, furnished adequate pro-
tection from overreaching Panel decisions without eroding the other objectives of the Act.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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rily its goal of granting federal employees meaningful collective
bargaining rights. This Comment will suggest a proposed amend-
ment whereby the Panel would be statutorily authorized to employ
final offer arbitration in the resolution of negotiation impasses.
The proposed amendment would permit the agency head to review
the final offers of the parties and raise any negotiability issues
within a thirty day period preceding the imposition of a settlement
by the Panel.
DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Authority declares an interpretation, it should be
accorded considerable weight because the Authority is entrusted
with the Act's administration and enforcement.25 An administra-
tive agency's construction, if it reasonably accomodates the con-
flicting policies that were committed to its care, should not be dis-
turbed by the court in the absence of a clearly contrary plain
meaning or legislative history. 6 The Authority's interpretation
reasonably accomodated the policy of allowing management to
"run the shop" with the policy of rendering collective bargaining
more meaningful for federal employees.17 Furthermore, a Panel-
imposed term is part of the collective bargaining agreement,28 and
neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act exempts
'2 See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2986 v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 775 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985) (court must defer to Authority's reasoned and
supportable construction of Act); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Federal La-
bor Relations Auth., 744 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court should uphold Authority's
defensible construction of the Act), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3497 (1985), cert. dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 1678 (1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Locals 225, 1504, & 3723 v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 712 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Authority interpretation
of Act commands respect).
z" See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). See also N.L.R.B. v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (courts can overturn administrative agency decision which frus-
trates underlying congressional purpose).
27 See infra note 31. Section 7114(c) enables the agency to "run the shop" by ensuring
that the agreement conforms to applicable laws, rules or regulations. S. REP. No. 969, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2723, 2831 (Section
7219 in Senate Report). Section 7119(c)(5)(B) makes collective bargaining more meaningful
for federal employees by providing neutral third party resolution of negotiation impasses.
See S. LEVITAN & A. NODEN, WORKING FOR THE SOVEREIGN 56 (1983) (involvement of neutral
party in negotiations was significant concession to unions); M. NESrr, supra note 2, at 288
(Panel satisfied need for central third party agency to settle disputes).
28 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Locals 225, 1504, & 3723, 712 F.2d 640, 646
n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 121, 10 F.L.R.A.
198, 199 (1982) (impasse resolution procedures of Panel operate as one aspect of collective
bargaining process).
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such a term from agency head review.29 Accordingly, it is submit-
ted that the majority properly sustained the Authority's
interpretation.
THE CONTINUED PROHIBITION ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
The Act adopted a middle ground in federal labor relations by
striking a balance between the collective bargaining rights of fed-
eral employees and the need to preserve the federal government's
ability to function in an effective and efficient fashion.3 0 Although
employees were given greater rights, management retained the
right to "run the shop."' Congress recognized that it could not
simply transplant the labor practices of the competitive private
sector marketplace to the federal sector.3 2 Congressional refusal in
29 See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(c) (1982) (no exemption for Panel-imposed terms); S. REP. No.
969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2723, 2831
(same). An agency head's invalidation of the agreement under section 7114(c) is the
equivalent of an assertion of non-negotiability. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local
1505, 7 F.L.R.A. 608, 608 (1982). Since section 7105(a)(5)(E) clearly authorizes the Author-
ity to resolve issues of negotiability, the Authority's determination that arbitration was not
the appropriate forum for review of the agency head's disapproval was also reasonable. See
Interpretation and Guidance, 11 F.L.R.A. 626, 628 (1983). See also National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 691 F.2d 553, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Con-
gress intended issues of negotiability to be decided by Authority).
o See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (1982) (objective is to prescribe rights and obligations of fed-
eral employees and to establish procedures designed to meet special requirements and needs
of government); H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978) (Act strikes proper bal-
ance between public interest and federal employees' demands to have greater voice in appli-
cable employment policies); 124 CONG. REc. 29,167; 29,197 (1978) (Congress intended to bal-
ance authority of management with protection of at least the existing rights of federal
employees). One of the underlying policies of the Act was to grant federal sector employees
the right to organize, bargain collectively and participate in decisions which affect them,
with full regard for the public interest and the effective conduct of public business. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101(a) (1982); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2860-61; see also H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 102 (1978) (President Carter's objective was to make federal sector labor relations
comparable to those of their private sector counterparts, while recognizing special require-
ments of federal government and overriding public interest in effective conduct of public
business).
11 See 124 CONG. REc. 25,713; 25,716 (1978) (Act, while granting federal employees
greater rights, preserved management's right to run shop); see also 124 CONG. REC. 25,713,
25,720 (1978) (management retains rights essential to flexible and effective operation); S.
REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2723, 2734 (Act insures agencies' right to manage government operations effectively and
efficiently).
32 See 124 CONG. REc. 29,167; 29,200 (1978). Representative Rousselot noted that public
and private sector labor relations cannot be equalized because the government is not a com-
petitive business but rather provides the public with certain essentials of life, which cannot
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granting federal employees the right to bargain over wages, salaries
and money-related fringe benefits exemplifies congressional recog-
nition of the differences between private and federal sector labor-
management relations. 33
Congress also demonstrated its unwillingness to equate federal
labor-management relations with its private sector counterpart by
denying federal employees the right to strike,34 which is the most
important economic weapon in the private sector.35 An underlying
rationale of this antistrike policy is that any strike against the fed-
eral government is an attack upon the state and a challenge to the
government's authority.38 The essentiality doctrine, which asserts
that the services provided by the federal government are essential
and cannot be disrupted without posing a threat to the public wel-
fare, supplies further bolstering for the anti-strike policy.37
otherwise be legitimately furnished the private sector. See id. at 29,200-01. See generally,
Fetscher, Negotiating with the Public: Montana's Public Employee Bargaining Act, 36
MONT. L. REv. 80, 80 (1975) (unlike private employers' primary profit objective, public sector
is concerned with furnishing services to public, so general public suffers the hardships
caused by impasses, strikes and other conflicts in public sector).
33 See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1) (1982). While the expenditure of public funds for the provi-
sion of the essential services furnished by public employees is justifiable, granting federal
employees the right to bargain over their wages, salaries and benefits would subordinate the
public interest to the interests of federal sector employees. See 124 CONG. REc. 29,167,
29,200-01 (1978).
34 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2)(v) (1982) (definition of employee excludes strike partici-
pants); Id. at § 7116(b)(7)(A) (unfair labor practice for labor organization to participate in
or call a strike). See also Meltzer & Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discre-
tion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 731, 777 (1983) (Title VII reaffirmed
anti-strike policy by adopting several provisions that reflect continued legislative opposition
to federal employee strikes). Air traffic controllers are among the groups of federal employ-
ees who are prohibited from striking. See Air Transport Ass'n of America v. PATCO, 667
F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1981). In PATCO, striking air traffic controllers were permanently
enjoined from violating 5 U.S.C. § 7311, and were required to pay coercive fees. Id. at 317,
323.
" See Public Employment, supra note 2, at 1700; Olson, Advances to Impasse Resolu-
tion: The Use of the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 494, 494 (1982).
See also Note, Comparison of Impasse Procedures: The New York City Collective Bargain-
ing Law and the New York State Taylor Law, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1039, 1040 (1981) (ban
on public sector strikes has eliminated weapon long regarded as essential for unions to
achieve their objectives).
3 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 640. See also R. KEARmY, supra note 2, at 214
(sovereignty doctrine asserts that government concession to striking public workers would
be equivalent to a direct challenge to people's will since sovereignty is constitutionally
vested in citizens).
-" See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 640-41; Note, supra note 35 at 1040. Representa-
tive Rudd felt that the disruption of essential services, for which there is no alternative
source of supply, threatens the public well-being and causes extreme hardship to individuals
and businesses nationwide. See 124 CONG. REc. 29,167, 29,190 (1978). See also McGuire &
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CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR TRUE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
Federal employees, having been denied the right to strike,
need a more viable alternative to impasse resolution than the
mechanisms currently provided by the Act.38 The current impasse
resolution procedures provided by the Act, such as mediation and
fact-finding, fail to accomplish the Act's goal of promoting more
effective federal sector collective bargaining.39 It has been urged
that compulsory interest arbitration is necessary in public sector
labor-management relations, where the employees do not fully en-
joy collective bargaining rights.40 The critics of compulsory arbitra-
tion assert that such binding arbitration has a "chilling effect" on
negotiations. 41 This criticism has spawned final offer arbitration, a
Dench, Public Employee Bargaining Under the Municipal Public Employees Labor Rela-
tions Act: The First Five Years, 27 ME. L. REv. 25, 108 (1975) (peaceful impasse resolution
procedures necessary because labor disputes can impair delivery of public services).
38 Cf. Public Employment, supra note 2, at 1706 (prohibition on federal sector strikes
would be inconsequential if satisfactory channels of impasse resolution are made available).
" See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Reso-
lution of Disputes, 72 COLO. L. REv. 1192, 1192 (1972). See also Anderson, MacDonald &
O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining-An Examination of
Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 453, 453 (1977) (com-
pulsory binding interest arbitration developed to replace ineffective traditional methods of
impasse resolution to avert work stoppages by public employees caused by deadlocked con-
tract negotiations). Mediation is the stage where a third party intervenes to aid in negotia-
tions. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How AaRIRATION WORKS 4 (2d ed. 1985). Fact-finding
refers to the stage where a fact-finder investigates and assembles all the facts surrounding
the dispute and issues a report which may include recommendations. Id. These approaches
rely on the willingness of the parties to compromise and frequently fail to produce effective
solutions. McAvoy, supra, at 1192.
40 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 39, at 15. In compulsory interest arbitra-
tion, an arbitrator must decide future contract terms which will bind parties who have failed
to achieve a new agreement through collective bargaining. See Craver, Public Sector Im-
passe Resolution Procedures, 60 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 779, 784 n.24 (1984). A number of
states have instituted binding arbitration of contract terms to avoid work stoppages that
result from impasses. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c (West Supp. 1985); IowA CODE
ANN. § 20.22 (West 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.31- 423.242 (West 1978); N.Y. Civ.
SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1983). Proponents of binding arbitration assert that these pro-
cedures would prevent disruption of public services by eliminating the public employee
strike. See Arnold, The Historical Development of Public Employee Collective Bargaining
in Nebraska, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 477, 490 (1982).
41 See Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, supra note 39, at 456. The critics claim that
the availability of interest arbitration as a final procedure discourages serious bargaining
and compromise since the parties may believe they can gain more through neutral arbitra-
tion than through negotiation. See id. See also Public Employment, supra note 2, at 1709
(prospect of arbitration has "chilling effect" on parties during negotiations, especially on
their willingness to achieve compromise).
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process by which the arbitrators select one of the last best offers
submitted by the two sides.42
The power vested in the Panel to resolve impasses has been
interpreted to include the authority to impose contract terms and
the orders of the Panel have been considered binding arbitration.43
However, this binding arbitration is not absolute, because Panel
orders are subject to review by both the Authority and the courts."
It is suggested that Congress amend the Act in order to meet a
bifurcated goal: (1) clearly establish the Panel as a final offer arbi-
trator in federal sector negotiation impasses; and (2) provide for
agency head review of the parties' final offers thirty days prior to
imposition of a settlement by the Panel.45 It is further suggested
42 See Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, supra note 39, at 495. Laner & Manning, In-
terest Arbitration: A New Terminal Impasse Resolution Procedure For Illinois Public Sec-
tor Employees, 60 CHL[-]KENT L. REv. 839, 843 (1984). Final offer arbitration can be either
"total package," where the arbitrators choose one of the last best offers in its entirety or
issue-by-issue, where the arbitrators select between the final offers on an issue-by-issue ba-
sis. See Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, supra note 39, at 495-98. The proponents of final
offer arbitration find that it adequately replaces the right to strike by compelling each party
to advance reasonable proposals because of their mutual fear that the other party's offer will
be adopted. See Laner & Manning, supra, at 843; Comment, Final Offer Mediation-Arbitra-
tion and the Limited Right to Strike: Wisconsin's New Municipal Employment Bargaining
Law, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 167, 177. Therefore, final offer arbitration encourages the parties to
compromise and bargain. Id. at 177; see also McCabe, Problems in Federal Sector Labor-
Management Relations Under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 33 LAB.
L.J. 560, 563 (1982) (final offer arbitration compels both parties to look cautiously at the
merits of proposals they advance).
" See, e.g., Nebraska Military Dep't v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 705 F.2d 945,
950 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983) (Panel's authority to resolve impasses encompasses compelling the
parties to adopt disputed proposals); Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 659 F.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Act provides for binding arbitration by the
Panel if negotiations reach impasse), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); Howlett, supra note
6, at 835-36 (Panel's power to resolve impasses includes ordering the inclusion of contract
provisions and such an order is binding arbitration).
" See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2986 v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 775 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1985); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 771 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985); New York Council, Ass'n of Civilian Tech-
nicians v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 137
(1985); National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 712 F.2d 669
(D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (judicial review available when unfair labor practice proceeding is instituted).
45 Cf. McCabe, supra note 42, at 563 (Panel should employ final offer arbitration to
compel parties to engage in serious bargaining). The purpose of the Act was to grant federal
employees greater collective bargaining rights, while preserving the rights of management to
"run the shop." See 124 CONG. REC. 25,713, 25,716 (1977). Collective bargaining is rendered
ineffective in the absence of a threat which induces labor and management negotiators to
agree to a contract. See Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, supra note 39, at 509. Final offer
arbitration, which compels the parties to narrow their differences because of their mutual
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that a failure to raise issues of negotiability within such thirty day
period should render such Panel-imposed terms binding, and any
dispute relating to these terms should be resolved through the ne-
gotiated grievance procedure."'
CONCLUSION
Congress intended to grant federal employees meaningful col-
lective bargaining rights, while permitting management to retain
the right to "run the shop" through the enactment of Title VII of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Panel-imposed terms, which
are considered part of the collective bargaining agreement, were
not statutorily exempted from agency head review under section
7114(c). The Authority's interpretation, which was supportable
and reasonably accomodated the two conflicting policies of the Act,
was properly sustained by the majority. However, Congress should
amend the Act to grant federal employees meaningful collective
bargaining rights. The proposed amendment would statutorily au-
thorize the Panel to institute final offer arbitration and permit the
agency head to review the parties' final offers thirty days prior to
the imposition of a settlement by the Panel. Subsequent to this
thirty day period, any disputes concerning Panel-imposed terms
should be resolved through the negotiated grievance precedure.
Arthur J. Lynch
fear that the other party's offer will be accepted, operates as an incentive to compromise
and reach agreement and should provide an adequate substitute for the right to strike.
Laner & Manning, supra note 42, at 843; Comment, supra note 32, at 177. But see Public
Employment, supra note 2, at 1706 (arbitration not fully satisfactory substitute for right to
strike). Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration is more conducive to meaningful collective bar-
gaining than "total package" final offer arbitration, because the arbitrator can consider each
issue on its own merits. See Garber, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Pro-
posed Alternative, 26 ARB. J. 226, 232 (1971). The suggested amendment would make collec-
tive bargaining more meaningful for federal employees and management would retain the
right to "run the shop" through high-level review of the offers which potentially will become
part of the Panel-imposed settlement.
46 Cf. Louis A. Johnson Veterans Admin. Medical Center, 15 F.L.R.A. 347, 350 (1984)
(disputes relating to meaning and application of provisions of parties' collective bargaining
agreement properly resolved through negotiated grievance procedure); R. SMITH, H. ED-
WARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTO& CASES AND MATERIALS 893
(1974) (grievance arbitration involves determination of rights under an existing contract). It
is also suggested that the agency head should be precluded from raising negotiability issues
upon the expiration of the 30 day review period.
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